Universal Designated-Verifier Signature (UDVS) schemes are digital signature schemes with additional functionality which allows any holder of a signature to designate the signature to any desired designated-verifier such that the designated-verifier can verify that the message was signed by the signer, but is unable to convince anyone else of this fact.
Introduction
Universal Designated-Verifier Signature (UDVS) schemes introduced by Steinfeld et al [26] are digital signature schemes with additional functionality which allows any holder of a signature to designate the signature to any desired designated-verifier such that the designated-verifier can verify that the message was signed by the signer, but is unable to convince anyone else of this fact, because the verifier's secret key allows him to forge the designated-verifier signatures without the signer's cooperation. Such signature schemes protect the privacy of signature holders from dissemination of signatures by verifiers, and have applications in certification systems [26] .
The previous work [26] has shown how to construct efficient deterministic UDVS schemes from Bilinear group-pairs. However, since UDVS schemes reduce to standard signatures when no verifier designation is performed, it is natural to ask how to extend the classical Schnorr [24] or RSA [22] signature schemes into UDVS schemes, so that the existing key generation and signing implementation infrastructure for these schemes can be used without modification -the UDVS functionality can be added to such implementations as an optional feature. In this paper we show how this can be efficiently achieved, and provide concrete proofs of security for our schemes in the random oracle model [2] .
As shown in [26] , any secure efficient construction of an unconditionally-private UDVS scheme with unique signatures (e.g. fully deterministic UDVS schemes with unique secret keys) gives rise to a secure efficient ID-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme. Constructing secure and efficient IBE schemes from classical Diffie-Hellman or RSA problems is a long-standing open problem [3] , and until this problem is solved we also cannot hope to construct unconditionally-private UDVS schemes with unique signatures based on classical problems. However, the results in this paper show that by giving up the unique signature requirement and allowing randomization in either the signing (in the case of Schnorr signatures) or designation (in the case of RSA) algorithms, one can construct efficient UDVS schemes from classical problems. Although the UDVS schemes presented in this paper do not have unique signatures, they still achieve perfect unconditional privacy in the sense of [26] .
The proofs of all theorems in the paper are included in the Appendix.
Related Work
As pointed out in [26] , the concept of UDVS schemes can be viewed as an application of the general idea of designated-verifier proofs, introduced by Jakobsson, Sako and Impagliazzo [15] , where a prover non-interactively designates a proof of a statement to a verifier, in such a way that the verifier can simulate the proof by himself with his secret key and thus cannot transfer the proof to convince anyone else about the truth of the statement, yet the verifier himself is convinced by the proof. The distinctive feature of UDVS schemes is universal designation: anyone who obtains a signature can designate it.
Two of our proposed UDVS schemes (namely SchUDVS 2 and RSAUDVS) make use of the paradigm in [15] of using a trapdoor commitment in a non-interactive proof of knowledge to achieve verifier designation. Since the underlying construction techniques used in these schemes is known, we view our main contribution here is in providing a concrete security analysis which bounds the insecurity of these schemes in terms of the underlying primitives. Our third proposed scheme SchUDVS 1 shows an alternative and more efficient approach than the paradigm of [15] , for extending the Schnorr signature scheme into a UDVS scheme, using the Diffie-Hellman function. It is an analogoue of the the bilinearbased approach for constructing UDVS schemes proposed in [26] .
Besides providing UDVS schemes based on classical problems, another contribution of this paper is in defining a stronger unforgeability notion for UDVS schemes, which allows the forger access to the attacked designated verifier's verification oracle, as well as to the signer's signing oracle (whereas the model in [26] only allows access to the signing oracle). We analyse our schemes in this stronger model.
There have been other approaches proposed to address the privacy threat associated with dissemination of verifiable signed documents. Chaum and van Antwerpen [9, 7] introduced undeniable signatures for this purpose, which require a signer or confirmer's [8, 18, 17, 6, 12] interactive cooperation to verify a signature, but this approach places significant inconvenience and workload on verifiers and confirmers, compared to an off-line non-interactive verification. The work of Brands on digital credentials [5, 4] suggests further approaches to enhance user privacy, such as selective disclosure of attributes (see also [27] ) and unlinkability of user transactions. Chameleon signatures [16] allow designation of signatures to verifiers by the signer, and in addition allow a signer to prove a forgery by a designated verifier. Ring signatures [21] , when restricted to two users, can also be viewed as designated-verifier signatures, where one user is the actual signer and the other user is the designated-verifier who can also forge the two-user ring signature, thus providing the privacy property, called signer anonymity in the context of ring signatures. However, signer designation is still performed by the signer in these schemes.
Preliminaries 2.1 Algorithms and Probability Notation
We say that a function f : IN → IR is a negligible function if, for any c > 0, there exists k 0 ∈ IN such that f (k) < 1/k c for all k > k 0 . We say that a probability function p : IN → IR is overwhelming if the function q : IN → IR defined by q(k) = 1−p(k) is a negligible function. For various algorithms discussed, we will define a sequence of integers to measure the resources of these algorithms (e.g. running-time plus program length, number of oracle queries to various oracles). All these resource parameters can in general be functions of a security parameter k of the scheme. We say that an algorithm A with resource parameters RP = (r 1 , . . . , r n ) is efficient if each resource parameter r i (k) of A is bounded by a polynomial function of the security parameter k, i.e. there exists a k 0 > 0 and c > 0 such that r i (k) < k c for all k > k 0 .
Discrete-Log and Diffie-Hellman Problems
Our schemes use the following known hard problems for their security. For all these problems GC denotes an algorithm that on input a security parameter k, returns an instance (D G , g) of a multiplicative group G of prime order q with generator g (the description string D G determines the group and contains the group order q).
1 Discrete-Log Problem (DL) [10] : Given (D G , g) = GC(k) and y 1 = g x 1 for uniformly random x 1 ∈ Z Z q , compute x 1 . We say that DL is hard if the success probability Succ A,DL (k) of any efficient DL algorithm A with run-time t(k) is upper-bounded by a negligible function InSec DL (t) of k.
2 Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDH) [10] : Given (D G , g) = GC(k), y 1 = g x 1 and y 2 = g x 2 for uniformly random x 1 , x 2 ∈ Z Z q , compute CDH g (g x 1 , g x 2 ) def = g x 1 x 2 . We say that CDH is hard if the success probability Succ A,CDH (k) of any efficient CDH algorithm A with run-time t(k) is upper-bounded by a negligible function InSec CDH (t) in k.
3 Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem (SDH) [1, 19] : Given (D G , g) = GC(k), y 1 = g x 1 and y 2 = g x 2 for uniformly random x 1 , x 2 ∈ Z Z q , compute g x 1 x 2 given access to a restricted Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) oracle DDH x 1 (., .), which on input (w, K) ∈ G × G, returns 1 if K = w x 1 and 0 else. We say that SDH is hard if the success probability Succ A,SDH (k) of any efficient SDH algorithm A with run-time t(k) and which makes up to q(k) queries to DDH x 1 (., .), is upper-bounded by a negligible function InSec SDH (t, q) in k.
We remark that the Strong Diffie-Hellman problem (SDH) as defined above and in [1] is a potentially harder variant of the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem as defined in [19] . The difference between the two problems is in the DDH oracle: In the GDH problem the DDH oracle accepts four inputs (h, z 1 , z 2 , K) from the attacker and decides whether K = CDH h (z 1 , z 2 ), whereas in the SDH problem the attacker can only control the (z 2 , K) inputs to the DDH oracle and the other two are fixed to the values h = g and z 1 = y 1 (we call this weaker oracle a restricted DDH oracle).
Trapdoor Hash Functions
Some of our proposed UDVS schemes make use of a general cryptographic scheme called a trapdoor hash function. We recall the definition and security notions for such schemes [25] . A trapdoor hash function scheme consists of three efficient algorithms: a key generation algorithm GKF, a hash function evaluation algorithm F , and a collision solver algorithm CSF. On input a security parameter k, the (randomized) key-gen. algorithm GKF(k) outputs a secret/public-key pair (sk, pk). On input a publickey pk, message m ∈ M and random r ∈ R (Here M and R are the message and randomness spaces, respectively), the hash function evaluation algorithm outputs a hash string h = F pk (m; r) ∈ H (here H is the hash string space). On input a key-pair (sk, pk), a message/randomizer pair (m 1 , r 1 ) ∈ M × R and a second message m 2 ∈ M , the collision solver algorithm outputs a second randomizer r 2 = CSF((sk, pk), (m 1 , r 1 ), m 2 ) ∈ R such that (m 1 , r 1 ) and (m 2 , r 2 ) constitute a collision for F pk , i.e. F pk (m 1 ; r 1 ) = F pk (m 2 ; r 2 ).
There are two desirable security properties for a trapdoor hash function scheme TH = (GKF, F, CSF). The scheme TH is called collision-resistant if the success probability Succ CR A,TH of any efficient attacker A in the following game is negligible. A key-pair (sk, pk) = GKF(k) is generated, and A is given k and the public-key pk. A can run for time t and succeeds if it outputs a collision (m 1 , r 1 ) and (m 2 , r 2 ) for F pk satisfying F pk (m 1 , r 1 ) = F pk (m 2 , r 2 ) and m 1 = m 2 . We denote by InSec CR TH (t) the maximal success probability in above game over all attackers A with run-time plus program length at most t. The scheme TH is called perfectly-trapdoor if it has the following property: for each key-pair (sk, pk) = GKF(k) and message pair (m 1 , m 2 ) ∈ M × M , if r 1 is chosen uniformly at random from R, then r 2 def = CSF((sk, pk), (m 1 , r 1 ), m 2 ) ∈ R has a uniform probability distribution on R.
Remark 1.
Several examples of trapdoor hash function schemes are given in [25] . To make the UDVS scheme SchUDVS 2 provably secure based on the discrete-log assumption, one can use the following simple trapdoor hash function scheme TH DL , similar to that given in [25] . Let h : {0, 1} * → Z Z q be any collision-resistant hash function. The key gen. algorithm GKF chooses a group G of prime order q and outputs key-pair sk = (D G , g, x) and pk = (D G , g, y) where x is random in Z Z * q and y = g x ∈ G (here D G is description string for group G, including the prime group order q). On input the public key pk, and message/randomizer pair (m, r) ∈ {0, 1} * × Z Z q , the evaluation algorithm computes the hash h s = F pk (m; r) = g h(m) · y r ∈ G. On input (sk, pk) and (m 1 , r 1 , m 2 ), the collision solver outputs r 2 = r 1 + (h(m 1 ) − h(m 2 )) · x −1 mod q. The scheme TH DL is collision-resistant as long as h is collisionresistant and the discrete-log is hard in G. TH DL is also perfectly-trapdoor.
Universal Designated-Verifier Signature (UDVS) Schemes
We review the definition of UDVS schemes and their security notions [26] . For unforgeability we also introduce a stronger notion of security than used in [26] .
A Universal Designated Verifier Signature (UDVS) scheme DVS consists of seven algorithms and a 'Verifier Key-Registration Protocol' P KR . All these algorithms may be randomized.
1. Common Parameter Generation GC -on input a security parameter k, outputs a string consisting of common scheme parameters cp (publicly shared by all users). 2. Signer Key Generation GKS -on input a common parameter string cp, outputs a secret/public key-pair (sk 1 , pk 1 ) for signer. 3. Verifier Key Generation GKV -on input a common parameter string cp, outputs a secret/public key-pair (sk 3 , pk 3 ) for verifier.
4.
Signing S -on input signing secret key sk 1 , message m, outputs signer 's publicly-verifiable (PV) signature σ. 5. Public Verification V -on input signer 's public key pk 1 and message/PV-signature pair (m, σ), outputs verification decision d ∈ {Acc, Rej}. 6. Designation CDV -on input a signer 's public key pk 1 , a verifier 's public key pk 3 and a message/PV-signature pair (m, σ), outputs a designated-verifier (DV) signature σ. 7. Designated Verification VDV -on input a signer 's public key pk 1 , verifier 's secret key sk 3 , and message/DV-signature pair (m, σ), outputs verification decision d ∈ {Acc, Rej}. 8. Verifier Key-Registration P KR = (KRA, VER) -a protocol between a 'Key Registration Authority' (KRA) and a 'Verifier' (VER) who wishes to register a verifier's public key. On common input cp, the algorithms KRA and VER interact by sending messages alternately from one to another. At the end of the protocol, KRA outputs a pair (pk 3 , Auth), where pk 3 is a verifier's public-key, and Auth ∈ {Acc, Rej} is a key-registration authorization decision. We write P KR (KRA, VER) = (pk 3 , Auth) to denote this protocol's output.
Verifier Key-Reg. Protocol. The purpose of the 'Verifier Key-Registration' protocol is to force the verifier to 'know' the secret-key corresponding to his public-key, in order to enforce the non-transferability privacy property. In this paper we assume, following [26] , the direct key reg. protocol, in which the verifier simply reveals his secret key to the KRA.
Consistent UDVS Schemes. The 'PV-Consistency' property requires that the PV-signatures produced by the signer are accepted as valid by the PV-verification algorithm V. The 'DV-Consistency' property requires that the DV-signatures produced by the designator using the designation algorithm CDV are accepted as valid by the DV-verification algorithm VDV. A UDVS scheme is consistent if it has both of the above consistency properties.
Unforgeability
In the case of a UDVS scheme there are actually two types of unforgeability properties to consider. The first property, called called 'PV-Unforgeability', is just the usual existential unforgeability notion under chosen-message attack [13] for the standard PV signature scheme D = (GC, GKS, S, V) induced by the UDVS scheme (this prevents attacks to fool the designator ). The second property, called 'DVUnforgeability', requires that it is difficult for an attacker to forge a DV-signature σ * by the signer on a 'new' message m * , such that the pair (m * , σ * ) passes the DV-verification test with respect to a given designated-verifier's public key pk 3 (this prevents attacks to fool the designated verifier, possibly mounted by a dishonest designator). As pointed out in [26] , it is sufficient to prove the DV unforgeability of a UDVS scheme, since the 'DV-unforgeability' property implies the 'PV-unforgeability' property.
In this paper we introduce a stronger version of DV-unforgeability than used in [26] , which we call ST-DV-UF. This model allows the forger also access to the verification oracle of the designated-verifier (this oracle may help the forger because it uses the designated-verifier's secret key, which in turn can be used to forge DV signatures, as required by the privacy property). Note that the model in [26] does not provide this oracle. We believe it is desirable for UDVS schemes to be secure even under such attacks, and place no restrictions on the attacker in accessing the verifier's oracle -in particular the attacker can control both the message/DV sig. pair as well as the signer's public key in accessing this oracle. We remark (proof omitted) that the strong DV-unforgeability of the UDVS scheme in [26] follows (in the random-oracle model) from the hardness of a gap version of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem, in which the attacker has access to a BDH decision oracle (whereas just hardness of BDH suffices for this scheme to achieve the weaker DV-unforgeability notion in [26] ).
Definition 3.1 (Strong DV-Unforgeability). Let DVS = (GC, GKS, GKV, S, V, CDV, VDV, P KR ) be a UDVS scheme. Let A denote a forger attacking the unforgeability of DVS. The Strong DV-Unforgeability notion ST-UF-DV for this scheme is defined as follows:
1. Attacker Input: Signer and Verifier's public-keys (pk 1 , pk 3 ) (where (sk 1 , pk 1 ) = GKS(cp), (sk 3 , pk 3 ) = GKV(cp) and cp = GC(k)). 2. Attacker Resources: Run-time plus program-length at most t, Oracle access to signer's signing oracle S(sk 1 , .) (q s queries), oracle access to designated-verifier's verification oracle VDV(., sk 3 , ., .) (q v queries) and, if scheme DVS makes use of n random oracles RO 1 , . . . , RO n , allow q RO i queries to the ith oracle RO i for i = 1, . . . , n. We write attacker's Resource Parameters (RPs) as RP = (t, q s , q v , q RO 1 , . . . , q ROn ). 3. Attacker Goal: Output a forgery message/DV-signature pair (m * , σ * ) such that:
(1) The forgery is valid, i.e. VDV(pk 1 , sk 3 , m * , σ * ) = Acc.
(2) Message m * is 'new', i.e. has not been queried by attacker to S.
Security Notion Definition:
Scheme is said to be unforgeable in the sense of ST-UF-DV if, for any efficient attacker A, the probability Succ
(k) that A succeeds in achieving above goal is a negligible function of k. We quantify the insecurity of DVS in the sense of ST-UF-DV against arbitrary attackers with resource parameters RP = (t, q s , q v , q RO 1 , . . . , q ROn ) by the probability
where the set AS RP contains all attackers with resource parameters RP .
Non-Transferability Privacy
Informally, the purpose of the privacy property for a UDVS scheme is to prevent a designated-verifier from using the DV signature σ dv on a message m to produce evidence which convinces a third-party that the message m was signed by the signer. The privacy is achieved because the designated-verifier can forge DV signatures using his secret-key, so even if the designated-verifier reveals his secret key to the third-party, the third-party cannot distinguish whether a DV signature was produced by the designator or forged by the designated-verifier.
We review the privacy model from [26] . The attacker is modelled as a pair of interacting algorithms (A 1 , A 2 ) representing the designated-verifier (DV) and Third-Party (TP), respectively. Let A 1 denote a forgery strategy. The goal of A 2 is to distinguish whether it is interacting with A 1 who has access to designated signatures (game yes) or with A 1 , who doesn't have access to designated signatures (game no). More precisely, the game yes runs in two stages as follows.
are run on input pk 1 , where (sk 1 , pk 1 ) = GKS(cp) and cp = GC(k). In this stage, A 1 has access to: (1) signing oracle S(sk 1 , .), (2) KRA key-reg. oracle to register verifier public keys pk via P KR interactions, (3) A 2 oracle for querying a message to A 2 and receiving a response. At end of stage 1, A 1 outputs a message m * not queried to S during the game (m * is given to A 2 ). Let σ * = S(sk 1 , m * ).
Stage 2. A 1 continues to make S,KRA and A 2 queries as in stage 1, but also has access to a designation oracle CDV(pk 1 , ., m * , σ * ) which it can query with any verifier public-key pk which was answered Acc by a previous KRA key-reg. query. At end of stage 2, A 2 outputs a decision d ∈ {yes, no}.
The game no is defined in the same way except that (1) A 1 is replaced by A 1 , (2) A 1 receives as input pk 1 and the program for A 1 , (3) A 1 cannot make any designation queries. Definition 3.2 (PR-Privacy [26] ). Let DVS = (GC, GKS, GKV, S, V, CDV, VDV, P KR ) be a UDVS scheme. Let (A 1 , A 2 ) denote an attack pair against the privacy of DVS. Let A 1 denote a forgery strategy. The privacy notion PR for this scheme is defined as follows:
1. Attacker Input: Signer public-key pk 1 (where (sk 1 , pk 1 ) = GKS(cp), and cp = GC(k)). Note that A 1 also accepts the program for A 1 as input. 4. Attacker Goal: Let P (A 1 , A 2 ) and P ( A 1 , A 2 ) denote the probabilities that A 2 outputs yes when interacting with A 1 (game yes) and A 1 (game no), respectively. The goal of (A 1 , A 2 ) is to achieve a non-negligible convincing measure
5. Security Notion Definition: Scheme is said to achieve privacy in the sense of PR if there exists an efficient forgery strategy A 1 such that the convincing measure C A 1 (A 1 , A 2 ) achieved by any efficient attacker pair (A 1 , A 2 ) is negligible in the security parameter k. We quantify the insecurity of DVS in the sense of PR against arbitrary attacker pairs (A 1 , A 2 ) with resources (RP 1 , RP 2 ) (attacker set AS RP 1 ,RP 2 ), with respect to arbitrary forgery strategies A 1 with resources RP 1 (attacker set AS RP 1 ) by the probability
If InSec PR DVS (RP 1 , RP 1 , RP 2 ) = 0 holds for any computationally unbounded A 2 , it is said to be perfect unconditional privacy. If privacy holds when q s1 = q s1 it is said to be complete privacy.
Two Extensions of Schnorr Signature Scheme into UDVS Schemes
We will present two UDVS schemes which are both extensions of the Schnorr [24] signature scheme (that is, the signer key-generation, signing and public-verification algorithms in both schemes are identical to those of the Schnorr signature). The first UDVS scheme SchUDVS 1 has an efficient and deterministic designation algorithm and its unforgeability relies on the Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) assumption. The second UDVS scheme SchUDVS 2 has a less efficient randomized designation algorithm, but its unforgeability follows from the weaker Discrete-Logarithm (DL) assumption (in the random-oracle model).
First Scheme: SchUDVS 1
Our first UDVS scheme SchUDVS 1 is defined as follows. Let {0, 1} ≤ℓ denote the message space of all bit strings of length at most ℓ bits. The scheme makes use of a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1} ≤ℓ × {0, 1} l G → {0, 1} l H , modelled as a random-oracle [2] in our security analysis. We assume that elements of the group G output by algorithm GC are represented by bit strings of length l G ≥ l q bits, where l q def = ⌊log 2 q⌋ + 1 is the bit length of q.
1. Common Parameter Generation GC. (Identical to Schnorr). Choose a group G of prime order q > 2 l H with description string D G (e.g. if G is a subgroup of Z Z * p , the string D G would contain (p, q)), and let g ∈ G denote a generator for G. The common parameters are cp = (D G , g).
2.
Signer Key Generation GKS. (Identical to Schnorr). Given the common parameters cp, pick random x 1 ∈ Z Z * q and compute y 1 = g x 1 . The public key is pk 1 = (cp, y 1 ). The secret key is sk 1 = (cp, x 1 ).
3. Verifier Key Generation GKV. Given the common parameters cp, pick random x 3 ∈ Z Z * q and compute y 3 = g x 3 . The public key is pk 3 = (cp, y 3 ). The secret key is sk 3 = (cp, x 3 ).
4. Signing S. (Identical to Schnorr). Given the signer's secret key (cp, x 1 ), and message m, choose a random k ∈ Z Z q and compute u = g k , r = H(m, u) and s = k + r ·x 1 (mod q). The PV signature is σ = (r, s). Unforgeability. The PV-Unforgeability of SchUDVS 1 is equivalent to the unforgeability of the Schnorr signature, which in turn is equivalent to the Discrete-Logarithm (DL) assumption in G, assuming the random-oracle model for H(.) [20] . However, for the DV-Unforgeability of SchUDVS 1 , it is clear that the stronger 'Computational Diffie-Hellman' (CDH) assumption in G is certainly necessary -an attacker can forge a DV signature (u, K) on a message m by choosing a random u ∈ G, computing r = H(m, u) and then K = CDH g (u · y r 1 , y 3 ) (indeed this is the idea behind the proof of the privacy of SchUDVS 1 -see below). Moreover, in the strong DV-unforgeability attack setting, the even stronger 'Strong Diffie-Hellman' (SDH) assumption in G is necessary. This is because the forger's access to the verifier's VDV oracle allows him to simulate the fixed-input DDH oracle DDH x 3 (w, K) which decides whether K = w x 3 or not (see Sec. 2.2), namely we have DDH x 3 (w, K) = VDV(y ′ 1 , x 3 , m, (u, K)) with y ′ 1 = (w · u −1 ) r −1 mod q and r = H(m, u). Note that this does not rule out the possibility that there may be another attack which even bypasses the need to break SDH. Fortunately, the following theorem shows that this is not the case and SDH is also a sufficient condition for Strong DV-Unforgeability of SchUDVS 1 , assuming the random-oracle model for H(.). The proof uses the forking technique, as used in the proof in [20] of PV-Unforgeability of the Schnorr signature.
Theorem 4.1 (Strong DV-Unforg. of SchUDVS 1 ). If the Strong Diffie-Hellman problem (SDH) is hard in groups generated by the common-parameter algorithm GC, then the scheme SchUDVS 1 achieves Strong DV-unforgeability (ST-UF-DV notion) in the random-oracle model for H(.). Concretely, the following insecurity bound holds:
Here we denote by T g the time needed to perform a group operation in G.
Privacy. The privacy of SchUDVS 1 follows from the existence of an algorithm for forging DV signatures (with identical probability distribution as that of real DV signatures) using the verifier's secret key, which is a trapdoor for solving the CDH problem on which the DV-Unforgeability relies. 
where
s resource parameters and RP 1 = ( t 1 , q s1 , q c1 , q k1 ) denotes the forgery strategy A 1 's resources, which are given by:
Second Scheme: SchUDVS 2
Our second UDVS scheme SchUDVS 2 trades off efficiency for a better provable unforgeability security guarantee. Rather than using the Diffie-Hellman trapdoor function to achieve privacy, we instead get the designator to produce a Schnorr proof of knowledge of the PV signature (r, s). This proof of knowledge is made non-interactive in the random-oracle model using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [11] , but using a trapdoor hash function [16, 25] F y 3 (.; .) composed with a random oracle J(.) in producing the 'verifier random challenge' r for this proof of knowledge. The designated-verifier's secret key consists of the trapdoor for the hash function F y 3 , which suffices for forging the DV signatures, thus providing the privacy property. We remark that a similar technique was used by Jakobsson Sako and Impagliazzo [15] , who used a trapdoor commitment scheme in constructing a designated-verifier undeniable signature scheme. Our scheme can use any secure trapdoor hash function.
The resulting scheme is defined as follows. Let {0, 1} ≤ℓ denote the message space of all bit strings of length at most ℓ bits. The scheme makes use of two cryptographic hash functions H :
both modelled as randomoracles [2] in our security analysis. We also use a trapdoor hash function scheme TH = (GKF, F, CSF) with F y 3 : {0, 1} l G × R F → {0, 1} l F (we refer the reader to Section 2 for a definition of trapdoor hash function schemes). We assume that elements of the group G output by algorithm GC are represented by bit strings of length l G ≥ l q bits, where l q def = ⌊log 2 q⌋ + 1 is the bit length of q. ) . Choose a group G of prime order q with description string D G (e.g. if G is a subgroup of Z Z * p , the string D G would contain (p, q)), and let g ∈ G denote a generator for G. The common parameters are cp = (k, D G , g) (k is the security parameter).
Common Parameter Generation GC. (Identical to Schnorr

Signer Key Generation GKS. (Identical to Schnorr)
. Given the common parameters cp, pick random x 1 ∈ Z Z q and compute y 1 = g x 1 . The public key is pk 1 = (cp, y 1 ). The secret key is sk 1 = (cp, x 1 ).
3. Verifier Key Generation GKV. Given the common parameters cp = k, run TH's key-gen. algorithm to compute (sk, pk) = GKF(k). The public key is pk 3 = (cp, pk). The secret key is sk 3 = (cp, sk, pk).
Signing S. (Identical to Schnorr)
. Given the signer's secret key (cp, x 1 ), and message m, choose a random k ∈ Z Z q and compute u = g k , r = H(m, u) and s = k + r ·x 1 (mod q). The PV signature is σ = (r, s). 6. Designation CDV. Given the signer's public key y 1 , a verifier's public key pk 3 = (cp, pk) and a message/PV-signature pair (m, (r, s)),
7. Designated Verification VDV. Given a signer's public key y 1 , a verifier's secret key sk 3 = (cp, sk, pk), and message/DV-sig. pair (m, (u, r F , r, s)), accept if and only if J(m, r, u, h) = r,
Unforgeability. The idea behind the DV-Unforgeability of SchUDVS 2 , is that the DV signature is effectively a proof of knowledge of the s portion of the PV Schnorr signature (r, s) by the signer on m. Namely, using the forking technique we can use a forger for SchUDVS 2 to extract s and hence forge a Schnorr PV signature for some unsigned message m, or alternately to break the collision-resistance of the trapdoor hash scheme TH. We have the following concrete result. Note that we need only assume that J(.) is a random-oracle in proving this result, but we provide a count of H(.) queries to allow the use of our reduction bound in conjunction with known results on the unforgeability of the Schnorr signature which assume the random-oracle model for H(.).
Theorem 4.3 (Strong DV-Unforg. of SchUDVS 2 ). If SchUDVS 2 is PV-unforgeable (UF-PV notion)
and TH is collision-resistant (CR notion) then SchUDVS 2 achieves Strong DV-unforgeability (ST-UF-DV notion) in the random-oracle model for J(.). Concretely, the following insecurity bound holds:
Privacy. The privacy of SchUDVS 2 follows from the existence of an algorithm for forging DV signatures (with identical probability distribution as that of real DV signatures) using the verifier's secret key, which is a trapdoor for solving collisions in TH. In particular we need here the perfectly-trapdoor property of TH. This result holds in the standard model (no random-oracle assumptions).
Theorem 4.4 (Privacy of SchUDVS 2 ).
If the scheme TH is perfectly-trapdoor then SchUDVS 2 achieves complete and perfect unconditional privacy (in the sense of the PR notion). Concretely:
where RP 1 = (t 1 , q s1 , q c1 , q k1 , q d1 ) denotes A 1 's resource parameters and RP 1 = ( t 1 , q s1 , q c1 , q k1 ) denotes the forgery strategy A 1 's RPs, which are given by:
Here we let T g , T F , T GKF , T CSF , T J , T H denote the time to compute a group operation, and evaluate F , GKF,CSF, J and H respectively, and l pk denotes an upper-bound on the length of public keys for scheme TH.
RSA-Based Scheme: RSAUDVS
The idea for the construction of an RSA-based UDVS scheme is analogous to the second Schnorr-based scheme SchUDVS 2 , and is described as follows. The PV RSA signature known to the designator is the eth root σ = h 1/e mod N of the message hash h, where (N, e) is the signer's RSA public key.
To produce a DV signature on m, the designator computes a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the PV signature σ (made non-interactive using Fiat-Shamir method [11] ), which is forgeable by the verifier. The Guilliou-Quisquater ID-based signature [14] is based on such a proof and is applied here for this purpose. To make the proof forgeable by the verifier, we use a trapdoor hash function in the computation of the challenge, as done in the SchUDVS 2 scheme. We note that a restriction of the GQ proof that we use is that the random challenge r must be smaller than the public exponent e. To allow for small public exponents and achieve high security level, we apply α proofs in 'parallel', where α is chosen to achieve a sufficient security level -see security bound in our security analysis (a similar technique is used in the Fiat-Shamir signature scheme [11] ).
The resulting scheme is defined as follows. Let {0, 1} ≤ℓ denote the message space of all bit strings of length at most ℓ bits. The scheme makes use of two cryptographic hash functions H : {0,
l J /α . Note that we only need to assume that J(.) is a random-oracle model in our security analysis, and that we allow randomized RSA signatures with hash generation h = H(m; s) for random s. The corresponding verification is to check if R(h, m) = Acc or not, where R(.) is a binary relation function that outputs Acc if h is a valid hash of message m and outputs Rej else. Thus by a suitable choice of H(., .) and R(., .) our scheme can instantiated with any of the standardised variants of RSA signatures such as RSASSA-PSS or RSASSA-PKCS1-v15, as specified in the PKCS1 standard [23] . We also use a trapdoor hash function scheme TH = (GKF, F, CSF) with F y 3 : {0, 1} l G ×R F → {0, 1} l F (we refer the reader to Section 2 for a definition of trapdoor hash function schemes). Here l N denotes the length of RSA modulus N of the signer's public key. 6. Designation CDV. Given the signer's public key (cp, N, e), a verifier's public key pk 3 = (cp, pk) and a message/PV-signature pair (m, σ), choose α random elements k i ∈ Z Z * N and compute u = ( u 1 , . . . , u α ), where
7. Designated Verification VDV. Given a signer's public key (cp, N, e), a verifier's secret key sk 3 = (cp, sk, pk), and message/DV-sig. pair (m, (h, r F , r, s)), accept if and only if J(m, h, h) = r and R(m, h) = Acc, where h = F pk ( u; r F ) with u = ( u 1 , . . . , u α ) and
Unforgeability. Similar to the scheme SchUDVS 2 , thanks to the soundness of the GQ proof of knowledge of RSA inverses, we can prove the DV unforgeability of RSAUDVS assuming the PV-unforgeability of RSAUDVS (i.e. the existential unforgeability under chosen-message attack of the underlying standard RSA signature (GKS, S, V)) and the collision-resistance of the trapdoor hash TH. The concrete result is the following.
Theorem 5.1 (Strong DV-Unforg. of RSAUDVS). If RSAUDVS is PV-unforgeable (UF-PV notion)
and TH is collision-resistant (CR notion) then RSAUDVS achieves Strong DV-unforgeability (ST-UF-DV notion) in the random-oracle model for J(.). Concretely, the following insecurity bound holds:
Here we denote by T N the time needed to perform a multiplication in Z Z * N and l e = log 2 (e).
Privacy. The privacy of RSAUDVS is unconditional and complete, assuming the perfectly-trapdoor property of the trapdoor hash scheme TH.
Theorem 5.2 (Privacy of RSAUDVS).
If the scheme TH is perfectly-trapdoor then RSAUDVS achieves complete and perfect unconditional privacy (in the sense of the PR notion). Concretely:
Here we let T N , T F , T GKF , T CSF , T J , T H denote the time to compute a multiplication modulo N , and evaluate F , GKF, CSF, J and H respectively, and l pk denotes an upper-bound on the length of public keys for scheme TH.
Scheme Comparison
The following tables compare the security and performance features of the proposed schemes (also shown for comparison is an entry for the bilinear-based UDVS scheme DVSBM [26] . It is evident that SchUDVS 1 is more computationally efficient than SchUDVS 2 but its security relies on a stronger assumption and it also produces slightly longer DV signatures. The RSA-based scheme RSAUDVS has a disadvantage of long DV signature length (typically about 10 times the length of a standard RSA signature) assuming a low public exponent e = 2 16 + 1. However, the computation is about the same as in the Schnorr-based schemes. This is because the O(l J / log 2 (e)) exponentiations for RSAUDVS shown in Table 2 use a low exponent e, so the total computation is only O(l J ) modular multiplications. 
Conclusions
We have shown how to efficiently extend the standard Schnorr and RSA signature schemes into Universal Designated-Verifier Signature schemes, and provided a concrete security analysis of the resulting schemes. One problem of our RSA scheme is that the length of designated signatures is larger than standard RSA signatures by a factor roughly proportional to k/ log 2 (e), where k is the security parameter and e is the public exponent. An interesting open problem is to find an RSA based UDVS scheme with designated signatures only a constant factor longer than standard RSA signatures, independent of e.
A Proof of Theorem 4.1
We show how to use any efficient forging attacker A for breaking scheme SchUDVS 1 in the sense of ST-UF-DV with non-negligible probability to construct an efficient attacker A S for breaking the Strong Diffie-Hellman problem (SDH) with non-negligible probability, thus contradicting the assumed hardness of SDH. More precisely, we show that:
where A S has the run-time t[S] and makes q[S] DDH queries, as defined in the theorem statement. The theorem then follows immediately from (4), by taking maximums over all attackers A S with the given running time. It remains to construct the attacker A S and show that it satisfies (4).
Overview. We convert A into A S in two stages. In the first stage, we modify the S oracle simulator F S so that it does not use x 1 (by outputting a random pair (r, s) as the signature for message m and modifying the H oracle to answer consistently r whenever (m, g s · y −r 1 ) is later queried to H). We also modify the VDV oracle simulator F VDV such that it does not use x 3 directly but only indirectly via queries to a DDH x 3 (., .) oracle. At the end of the first stage we obtain an efficient algorithm for the following primitive problem P [q o , q d ]:
is a uniformly random integer in Z Z 2 l H ), and q d queries to restricted DDH oracle DDH x 3 (., .), (where DDH x 1 (w, K),
In the second stage we show how to convert any efficient algorithm for primitive problem P [q o , q d ] into an efficient algorithm for SDH. This reduction is an application of the forking technique [11, 20] , which involves running the attacker for P [q o , q d ] twice, answering its i * th O(.) query differently in the two runs to obtain two distinct solutions (i * , K * 1 ) (with
DDH oracle queries, and success probability
Proof. Modified Attacker A. We first define a modified attacker A which is obtained from the original attacker A in order to satisfy two properties (which may not be satisfied by A): (2) 
), assuming a binary search by A through the sorted list of past H-queries.
We now consider several attack games, starting at the original attack Game 0 and modifying A's view simulators to obtain the game Game 3 where A and its view simulators constitute the desired algorithm
Game 0 . This is the original forgery attack game UF-DV, where the view simulator F = (F S , F H ) for A consists of the actual scheme's S and H oracles respectively. The game Game 0 runs as follows on outcome I (we use bold letters to denote random variables which constitute the view of A, i.e. the inputs, oracle queries and responses of A, and output of A).
Setup. We run A on input I A = (D G , g, y 1 , y 3 ) , where (D G , g) = GC(k),y 1 = g x 1 for uniformly random x 1 ∈ Z Z q and y 3 = g x 3 for uniformly random x 3 ∈ Z Z q .
Oracle Queries. When A makes its ith oracle query Q i , F responds as follows:
(1) S-Query simulator F S . If Q i = m i is an S-Query, F S responds with R i = (r i , s i ) computed as follows:
is a H-Query, F H responds with R i = r i defined as follows:
This completes the description of Game 0 .
Let S 0 denote the event in Game 0 that A breaks SchUDVS 1 in the sense of ST-UF-DV. By definition, this means:
where W S denotes the set of S-query indices.
Let Bad 0 denote the event in Game 0 that A did not make a H-query (m * , u * ) during the attack.
where W H denotes the set of H-query indices.
Thanks to the randomness of H(.), we get:
Proof of Claim. If Bad 0 occurs, we know (m * , u * ) is not queried to H by A and also (by property (2) of A -see definition of A) not queried to H by F V . If S 0 also occurs, we know from (5)(b) that (m * , u * ) is not queried to H by F S either. Hence if S 0 ∧ Bad 0 occurs, then (m * , u * ) is not queried to H during the game, and therefore A's view (and hence its output (K * , u * )) is independent of r * = H(m * , u * ), which is in turn uniformly distributed in Z Z 2 l H . Since the mapping r * → (u * y r * 1 ) x 3 is one-to-one over Z Z 2 l H (because 2 l H < q and x 1 and x 3 are non-zero elements of Z Z q ), there is only one outcome for r * (out of 2 l H equiprobable outcomes) such that (u * y r * 1 ) x 3 = K * is satisfied. The claim follows. ⊓ ⊔ Let Bad 1 0 denote the event in Game 0 that a u i = g k i used by S-oracle in answering an S-query matches a previous u j appearing in an earlier query to H by either A or S-oracle: Bad 1 0 ⇒ There exists i ∈ W S such that u i = u j for some j < i.
Thanks to the randomness of the k i 's we get: and (m i * ,
The above results immediately give:
Proof of Claim. We have Pr[S
The claim now follows from Claims A.1 and A.2. ⊓ ⊔ Game 1 . In this game we modify the S-oracle simulator F S for A. The new simulator returns signatures (r i , s i ) where r i is just a uniformly random string ρ i in Z Z 2 l H , without querying (m i , u i ) to H. The game Game 1 runs as follows.
Setup. We run A on input I
, where (D G , g) = GC(k) and y 1 = g x 1 for uniformly random x 1 ∈ Z Z q and y 3 = g x 3 for uniformly random x 3 ∈ Z Z q .
Output. Eventually A outputs a forgery message/DV-sig. pair (m * , (u * , K * )).
This completes the description of Game 1 . Let S 2 1 denote the event in Game 1 corresponding to S 2 0 in Game 0 (i.e. S 2 1 is also defined by (8) over the view of A).
Proof of Claim. For outcomes in S 2 0 in Game 0 , the u i for each ith S-query is 'new' and hence by randomness of H(.) the responses r i = H(m i , u i ) are uniform and independent in Z Z 2 l H . Furthermore, H(.) is never queried again at (m i , u i ) during the game. Thus for each outcome in S 2 0 in Game 0 there is a corresponding outcome in S 2 1 in Game 1 , where the outcomes for ρ i in Game 1 coincide with outcomes for H(m i , u i ) in Game 0 for all i ∈ W S , maintaining the view of A unchanged. Since the ρ i 's are uniform and independent in Z Z 2 l H this outcome has the same probability in Game 1 as the original outcome in Game 0 . The claim follows.
⊓ ⊔ Game 2 . In this game we further modify the S-oracle simulator F S for A. The new simulator returns signatures (r i , s i ) where s i set equal to a uniformly random element ζ i in Z Z q , thus eliminating the use of x 1 by F S .
Setup. We run A on input I A = (D G , g, y 1 , y 3 ) , where (D G , g) = GC(k) and y 1 = g x 1 for uniformly random x 1 ∈ Z Z q and y 3 = g x 3 for uniformly random x 3 ∈ Z Z q .
(1) S-Query simulator F S . If Q i = m i is an S-Query, F S responds with R i = (r i , s i ) computed as follows: r i = ρ i for uniformly random ρ i ∈ Z Z 2 l H s i = ζ i for uniformly random ζ i ∈ Z Z q (2) H-Query simulator F H . As in Game 0 .
(3) VDV-Query simulator F V . As in Game 0 .
This completes the description of Game 2 . Let S 2 2 denote the event in Game 2 corresponding to S 2 1 in Game 1 (i.e. S 2 2 is also defined by (8) over the view of A). Claim A.5.
Proof of Claim. In Game 1 , the s i = k i + r i · x 1 mod q signature portions are uniformly random in Z Z q and independent of r i , thanks to the uniformly random and independent choice of k i ∈ Z Z q and the fact that mapping k i → k i + r i · x 1 mod q is a permutation of Z Z q . Hence, in Game 2 , setting s i = ζ i for uniformly random and independent ζ i ∈ Z Z q leaves the view of A unchanged and immediately gives the claimed result. ⊓ ⊔ Game 3 . In this game we modify the VDV-oracle simulator F V for A to use x 3 only indirectly via calls to a DDH x 3 (., .) oracle. We also eliminate calls to H(.) by F V , using the fact that A never makes 'new' (m i , u i ) queries to VDV.
Setup. We run A on input I A = (D G , g, y 1 , y 3 ), where (D G , g) = GC(k) and y 1 = g x 1 for uniformly random x 1 ∈ Z Z q and y 3 = g x 3 for uniformly random x 3 ∈ Z Z q .
(1) S-Query simulator F S . As in Game 2 .
(2) H-Query simulator F H . As in Game 0 .
is a VDV-Query, F V responds with R i = d i ∈ {Acc, Rej} defined as follows:
where r i = r j and j ∈ W S ∨ W H is the index of a previous matching query (m j , u j ) = (m i , u i )
This completes the description of Game 3 . Let S 2 3 denote the event in Game 3 corresponding to S 2 2 in Game 2 (i.e. S 2 3 is also defined by (8) 
of F V (assuming a binary search is used as for obtaining A from A), and the time O(log 2 (q s + q v + q H ) · (ℓ + l G )) for A P to search for i * such that (m * , u * ) = (m i * , u i * ) . This establishes the lemma.
⊓ ⊔
We will need the following lemma [20] in the analysis of the forking technique for the 'Stage 2' reduction. A proof can be found in [20] but we provide one here also for completeness.
Lemma A.2 (Splitting Lemma [20] ). Let a and b denote independent random variables over finite sets A and B, respectively, with probability mass functions P A (.) and P B (.), respectively. Let S ⊆ A× B be a set with
Then there exists a 'good' subset G of S such that:
and, for all (a, b) ∈ G, Pr[S(a)] ≥ ǫ/2.
Proof. Let us define the good set G to be the set of all (a, b) ∈ S such that Pr[S(a)] ≥ ǫ/2. Then it is enough to show that Pr[G] ≥ ǫ/2.
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that Pr
It follows that Pr[S] < ǫ/2 + ǫ/2 = ǫ, a contradiction. This shows that Pr[G] ≥ ǫ/2, which completes the proof.
⊓ ⊔
We will also use the following inequality.
Lemma A.3. Let p = q j=1 p j for some q real numbers p 1 , . . . , p q and let δ > 0 be given. If p ≥ q · δ then the following inequality holds:
Proof. We have
Using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality we have 
Here T g denotes the time to perform a group operation in G.
, our SDH algorithm A S works as follows (we assume without loss of generality that A S 's DDH oracle is DDH x 2 (., .) ). First Run. A S runs A P on input (D g , g, y 1 , y 2 ; ω), where ω is a random bit string used as the randomness input of A P (if A P is randomized), and answers its oracle queries as follows: (1) First Run Output. At the end of first run, A P outputs (i * , K * ) (note that if this run is successful then
Second Run. A S runs A P again on the same input (D g , g, y 1 , y 2 ; ω) as used in first run, but answers its oracle queries differently as follows: Second Run Output. At the end of second run, A P outputs ( i * , K * ) (note that if this run is successful and
A S 's output. A S computes and returns an estimate
This completes the description of A S . The running-time of A S is twice the run-time of A P plus the time to compute K at the end, which can be done in time O(l 2 q + l q · T g ). The number of DDH x 2 (., .) queries made by A S is up to twice the number of queries made by A P . This establishes the claimed resources of A S .
We now lower bound the success probability of A S . For i ∈ {1, . . . , q o }, we call a run of A P i-successful if A P succeeds and i * = i. Note that if both first and second runs of A P are i-successful for some i, then we have i
are the same in both runs because the view of A P is the same up to ith O(.) query response) and consequently A S 's estimate K is correct (whenever
So it remains to lower bound the probability of the event S * that both runs of A P are i-successful for some i ∈ {1, . . . and for each (a, b) ∈ G i , the probability that (a, b) ∈ S i over a random choice of b in B i is also at least p i /2. Hence, the probability that the outcome (a, b) of the first run of A P in our algorithm is in G i is at least p i /2, and then for each of those outcomes, the probability over the random choice of b = ( r[i] , . . . , r[q o ]) that the second run outcome (a, b) is in S i is at least p i /2. Since r[i] is uniformly chosen in Z Z 2 l H , the chance that it collides with r[i] is 1/2 l H , so with probability at least p i /2 − 1/2 l H over b we know that (a, b) ∈ S i and also r[i] = r[i]. Summarizing, we have that the probability that (1) (a, b) ∈ G i and (2) 
and since p i is the probability that a run of A P is i-successful, we know that
which is the desired lower-bound on A S 's success probability.
To complete the proof of the theorem, we apply to A the Stage 1 reduction (Lemma A.1) followed by the Stage 2 reduction (Lemma A.4) and obtain an algorithm A S for SDH with the claimed success probability bound (4) and resources t[S] and q[S], as claimed. ⊓ ⊔
B Proof of Theorem 4.2
The proof is straightforward but we give the details for completeness. To show the perfect unconditional privacy, assuming the direct verifier key-reg. protocol is used, we show how to use construct the forgery strategy A 1 which, for any given privacy attacker pair (A 1 , A 2 ), will perfectly simulate the DV signature answers to A 1 's designation queries y 3,i without the message m * being signed by the signer, using the corresponding secret key x 3,i that A 1 registered with y 3,i during a previous key-reg. query. This shows that the convincing measure C A 1 (A 1 , A 2 ) is zero for any (A 1 , A 2 ), as required.
Game yes. We recall first the original attack Game yes in which A 1 and A 2 interact.
. A 1 's oracle queries are answered as follows.
(1) S(x 1 , .) Queries. When A 1 makes ith S-query m i , it is answered with σ i = S(x 1 , m i ).
(2) KRA Queries. When A 1 makes ith key-reg. query (x 3,i , y 3,i ) it is answered Acc if g x3,i = y 3,i and Rej else. (3) A 2 Queries. When A 1 sends message m i to A 2 , A 2 responds with an answer a i .
End of Stage 1. A 1 outputs a challenge message m * which is given to A 2 . A PV signature σ i = (r * , s * ) = S(x 1 , m * ) is generated, where r * = H(m * , u * ) for u * = g k * for uniformly random k * ∈ Z Z q , and s * = k * + r * · x 1 mod q. Stage 2 begins. Stage 2. A 1 continues to make S,KRA and A 2 queries as in Stage 1 but can also make designation queries which are answered as follows:
(1) CDV Queries. When A 1 makes ith CDV-query y 3,i , it is answered with DV signature σ i = CDV(y 1 , y 3,i , m
End of Stage 2. A 2 outputs a decision d ∈ {yes, no}.
Game no. We now describe the other game where A 1 interacts with A 2 .
, where A 1 is also given the program for A 1 as input. A 1 now runs A 1 on same input and answers A 1 's oracle queries as follows.
(1) S(x 1 , .) Queries. When A 1 makes ith S-query m i , A 1 forwards it to S oracle and forwards response
End of Stage 1. A 1 outputs a challenge message m * , which is also output by A 1 and given to A 2 . A 1 computes u * = g k * and r * = H(m * , u * ), for a uniformly random k * ∈ Z Z q . Stage 2 begins.
Stage 2. A 1 continues to make S,KRA and A 2 queries, answered by A 1 as in Stage 1, but can also make designation queries which are answered as follows:
(1) CDV Queries. When A 1 makes ith CDV-query y 3,i , A 1 searches table T for an entry (x 3,j , y 3,j , Acc) with y 3,j = y 3,i (note that this entry is guaranteed to exist in T due to the restriction on A 1 to only query CDV with public keys which have been answered with Acc by a previous KRA query) and answers with
Note that A 1 's (and hence also A 2 ) view is perfectly simulated in Game no as in Game yes. This is because in both games u * and r * are computed identically and the DV signatures (u i , K i ) are also identical in both games because u i = g s * · y −r * 1 = u * in Game yes and u i = u * in Game no for all i, and K i = y s * 3,i = g x 3,i s * = (u * y −r * ) x 3,i in Game yes and K i = (u * · y −r * ) x 3,j = (u * · y −r * ) x 3,i in Game no. All other oracles are simulated identically in both games. So A 2 outputs yes with same probability in both games and hence C A 1 (A 1 , A 2 ) = 0, as claimed. The run-time of A 1 is the run-time of A 1 plus the time
) to answer A 1 's CDV and KRA queries. Note that q s1 = q s1 , q c1 = q c1 , and q k1 = 0, as claimed.
⊓ ⊔
C Proof of Theorem 4.3
We show how to use any efficient forging attacker A for breaking scheme SchUDVS 2 in the sense of ST-UF-DV with non-negligible probability to construct (1) an efficient attacker A S for breaking the PV unforgeability of scheme SchUDVS 2 (i.e. the unforgeability of the Schnorr signature scheme), and (2) an efficient attacker A T for breaking the collision-resistance of the trapdoor hash scheme TH, such that at least one of A S or A T succeed with non-negligible probability. More precisely, we show that:
) and (t[T ]) respectively, as defined in the theorem statement. The theorem then follows immediately from (11), by taking maximums over all attackers A S with the given running time. It remains to construct A S and A T and show (11) .
Modified Attacker A. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1, we first define a modified attacker A which is obtained from the original attacker A in order to satisfy two properties (which may not be satisfied by
e. unequal any earlier query to J(.) made by A), and (2) A does not make any VDV queries. Since the VDV oracle of A can be simulated knowing only the verifier's public key pk 3 , and using one query to H(.) and J(.) per VDV query, we can easily transform A into A such that A's resources (denoted with hats) are related to A's resources as follows:
Game 0 . Let Game 0 denote the original forgery attack game. In this game, let (m i , r i , u i , h i ) denote the ith J(.) query of A and r i the corresponding answer, let (m * , u * , r * F , r * , s * ) denote the output forgery of A, and let m ′ i denote the ith S-query of A. Let S 0 denote the event in Game 0 that A breaks SchUDVS 2 in the sense of ST-UF-DV. By definition, this means:
where W S denotes the set {1, . . . , q s } of S-query indices.
Let Bad 0 denote the event in Game 0 that A did not make a J-query (m * , r * , u * , h * ) during the attack.
where W J denotes the set {1, ..., q J } of J-query indices.
Thanks to the randomness of J(.), we get:
Proof of Claim. If Bad 0 occurs, we know (m * , r * , u * , h * ) is not queried to J(.) during the game, and therefore A's view (and hence its output (m * , u * , r * F , r * , s * )) is independent of J(m * , r * , u * , h * ), which is in turn uniformly distributed in Z Z 2 l J . Hence if Bad 0 occurs the chance that r * = J(m * , r * , u * , h * ) (so S 0 also occurs) is 1/2 l J . The claim follows.
⊓ ⊔ Let S 1 0 denote the event in Game 0 that S 0 occurs but Bad 0 does not. That is:
and
Proof of Claim. We have Pr[ [2] , . . . , r q J [2] ) with r i [1] 's and r i [2] 's chosen uniformly and independently at random from Z Z 2 l J (these vectors will be used to answer A P 's J(.) queries). A S also generates a TH key-pair (sk, pk) = GKF(k). A on input (D G , g, y 1 , pk; ω) , where ω is a random bit string used as the randomness input of A, and answers A's oracle queries as follows:
First Run. A S runs
(2) S-Query simulator F S . When A makes its jth S query m 
). Note that if this run is successful then there exists i * ∈ W J such that A's forgery satisfies (14) . We also define j * ∈ W S as the number of S-queries made by A before issuing its i * th J-query.
Second Run. A S runs A again on the same input (D g , g, y 1 , pk; ω) as used in first run, but answers its oracle queries differently as follows: 
This completes the description of A S . The running-time of A S is twice the run-time of A plus the time to compute (i * , j * ) and s * at the end, which takes total time O( q J (ℓ + l F + l G ) + l q T g + l 2 q ). The number of H-and S-queries made by A S is up to twice the number of queries made by A. This establishes the claimed resources of A S .
The collision-finder attacker A T runs A twice in the same way as A S , and at the end computes the following collision estimate (α [1] 
We now lower bound the sum of success probabilities of A S and A T . For each (i, j) ∈ W J × W S , we call a run of A (i, j)-successful if A's output satisfies (14) and (i * , j * ) = (i, j). Let S * denote the event that both runs of A above are (i, j)-successful for some (i, j) and r i [1] = r i [2] . Note that if S * occurs then, defining s * as the discrete-log
to base g in G, we have from (14) that
has not been queried to S during either run of A
) because the view of A is the same in both runs up to ith J(.) query response). We now split event S * into two disjoint subevents S * S and S * T , depending on whether
holds or not, respectively. If the subevent S * S occurs, then (17) holds and hence A S 's estimate s * is equal to the discrete-log s * = (
Thus S * S implies that A S 's forgery is valid and coupled with (15) means that A S succeeds to break the PV unforgeability of SchUDVS 2 in this case. In the other case that subevent S * T occurs, (17) does not hold but (16) holds, meaning that A T 's output is a valid collision for the trapdoor hash so A T succeeds.
So we have shown that the sum of success probabilities of A S and A T is equal to the probability of the event S * that both runs of A are (i, j)-successful for some (i, j) ∈ W J × W S and r i [1] = r i [2] , and it remains to lower bound Pr[S * ]. To do this, we split S * into |W J × W S | = q J q s disjoint subevents S * i,j according the value of (i, j) and bound each one. For each (i, j), let A i,j denote the outcome space for the random variable a i,j = (D g , g, y 1 , pk, ω, (r 1 , . . . , r i−1 ), (k 1 , . . . , k j )) consisting of the view of A up to the ith query to O(.) and the random elements k i used by S oracle to answer first j signature queries, and let B i,j denote the outcome space for the independent random variable b i,j = ((r i , . . . , r q J ), (k j+1 , . . . , k qs )) consisting of the view of A P after the ith query to O(.) (including the response r[i] to the ith query) and k i 's used to answer all remaining signature queries . Note that the event S i,j that a run of A is
Proceeding from this point analgously to the calculation in Lemma A.4, we apply the Splitting Lemma A.2 and obtain
and hence applying Lemma A.3 to (18) noting that i,j p i,j = Pr[S 1 0 ] we get
which using Claim C.2 gives the desired lower-bound (11) To show the perfect unconditional privacy, assuming the direct verifier key-reg. protocol is used, we show how to construct the forgery strategy A 1 which, for any given privacy attacker pair (A 1 , A 2 ), will perfectly simulate the DV signature answers to A 1 's designation queries pk i without the message m * being signed by the signer, using the corresponding secret key sk i that A 1 registered with pk i during a previous key-reg. query. This shows that the convincing measure C A 1 (A 1 , A 2 ) is zero for any (A 1 , A 2 ), as required.
(2) KRA Queries. When A 1 makes ith key-reg. query (r i , sk i , pk i ) it is answered Acc if (sk i , pk i ) = GKF(k; r i ) and Rej else. End of Stage 1. A 1 outputs a challenge message m * which is also given to A 2 . A PV signature σ i = (r * , s * ) = S(x 1 , m * ) is generated, where r * = H(m * , u * ) for u * = g k * for uniformly random k * ∈ Z Z q , and s * = k * + r * · x 1 mod q. Stage 2 begins.
Stage 2. A 1 continues to make S,KRA and A 2 queries as in Stage 1 but can also make designation queries which are answered as follows:
(1) CDV Queries. When A 1 makes ith CDV-query pk i , it is answered with DV signature
, , where A 1 is also given the program for A 1 as input. A 1 runs A 1 on same input and answers A 1 's oracle queries as follows.
and stores (sk i , pk i , Acc) in a table T , else it answers Rej. End of Stage 1. A 1 outputs a challenge message m * , which is also output by A 1 and given to A 2 . A 1 computes u * = g k * and r * = H(m * , u * ), for a uniformly random independent k * ∈ Z Z q . Stage 2 begins.
(1) CDV Queries. When A 1 makes ith CDV-query pk i , A 1 searches table T for an entry (sk j , pk j , Acc) with pk j = pk i (note that this entry is guaranteed to exist in T due to the restriction on A 1 to only query CDV with public keys which have been answered with Acc by a previous KRA query) and answers with
F,i ) for some fixed u ′ ∈ G and uniformly random and independent r ′ F,i ∈ R F , s i is uniformly random and independent in Z Z q , and
We show that A 1 's (and hence also A 2 ) view is perfectly simulated in Game no as in Game yes. In particular, the DV signatures ( σ i = (u i , r F,i , r i , s i ) are distributed identically in both games, for the following reasons. First, note that u * and r * are computed identically in both games. Second, observe that for each DV signature, r i and s i are determined uniquely by (m * , r * , u * , u i , r F,i ) in the same way in both games, namely
and s i is the discrete-log in G of u i (u * y r * 1 ) r i to base g in both games. So it remains to show that (for each DV signature) the pair ( u i , r F,i ) is identically distributed in both games. In Game yes,
From the perfectly-trapdoor property of TH we have that mapping r ′ F,i → CSF((sk, pk), ( u ′ , r ′ F,i ), u i ) is a permutation on R F . This and the fact that g has order q immediately implies that function G : Z Z q × R F → G × R F is one-to-one. So since ( s i , r ′ F,i ) is uniform on Z Z q × R F by definition, it follows that the image pair ( u i , r F,i ) is uniform on G × R F in Game no, as required. We conclude that A 2 outputs yes with same probability in both games and hence C A 1 (A 1 , A 2 ) = 0, as claimed. The run-time of A 1 is the run-time of A 1 plus the time q d1 O(l q T g + T F + T CSF + T J + T H + q d1 l pk ) + q k1 T GKF to answer A 1 's CDV and KRA queries. Note that q s1 = q s1 , q c1 = q c1 , and q k1 = 0, as claimed. ⊓ ⊔
E Proof of Theorem 5.1
The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.1 so we don't provide all details. We show how to use any efficient forging attacker A for breaking scheme RSAUDVS in the sense of ST-UF-DV with non-negligible probability to construct (1) an efficient attacker A S for breaking the PV unforgeability of scheme RSAUDVS (i.e. the unforgeability of the standard RSA signature scheme), and (2) an efficient attacker A T for breaking the collision-resistance of the trapdoor hash scheme TH, such that at least one of A S or A T succeed with non-negligible probability. More precisely, we show that:
where Modified Attacker A. As in Theorem 4.3, we first define a modified attacker A which is obtained from the original attacker A in order to satisfy two properties (which may not be satisfied by A): (1) Each J-query of A is 'new' (i.e. unequal any earlier query to J(.) made by A), and (2) A does not make any VDV queries. The A's resources (denoted with hats) are related to A's resources as follows:
Game 0 . Let Game 0 denote the original forgery attack game. In this game, let (m i , h i , h i ) denote A's ith J-query, and r i = ( r i,1 , . . . , r i,α ) the response to this query. Let (m * , h * , r * F , r * , s * ) denote A's output forgery, with r * = ( r * 1 , . . . , r * α ),
. . , q J } and W S = {1, . . . , q s }, and let m ′ i denote the ith S query of A. Analogously to Theorem 4.3, we define the event S 0 that A succeeds and the event S 1 0 :
and due to the randomness of J(.) we get 1 [k] , . . . , r i,α [k]) chosen uniformly and independently at random from Z Z α 2 l J /α for k ∈ {1, 2}. First Run. A S generates a TH key-pair (sk, pk) = GKF(k) and runs A on input (N, e, pk; ω), where ω is a random bit string used as the randomness input of A, and answers A's oracle queries as follows:
(2) S-Query simulator F S . When A makes its jth S query m (23) . We also define j * ∈ W S as the number of S-queries made by A before issuing its i * th J-query.
Second Run. A S runs A again on the same input (N, e, pk; ω) as used in first run, but answers its oracle queries differently as follows: [2] are in Z Z 2 l J /α we know that |δ r | < 2 l J /α < e and hence gcd(δ r , e) = 1, since e is prime. So there exist integers c r < e and c e < e such that c r · δ r + c e · e = 1 and A S can compute them in time O(l 2 e ). Then A S computes the PV sig.
. This completes the description of A S . The running-time of A S is twice the run-time of A plus the time to compute (i * , j * ) and σ * at the end, which takes total time O( q J (l F + l N ) + l 2 e + l e T N ). The number of H-and S-queries made by A S is up to twice the number of queries made by A. This establishes the claimed resources of A S .
The collision-finder attacker A T runs A twice in the same way as A S (except that it receives the hash function public key pk as input, and generates a signature key pair (N, e, d) = GKS(k) by itself, with which it answers A's signing queries -note that the hash function secret key sk is not needed by A T ), and at the end computes the following collision estimate (β [1] We now lower bound the sum of success probabilities of A S and A T . For each (i, j) ∈ W J × W S , we call a run of A (i, j)-successful if A's output satisfies (23) and (i * , j * ) = (i, j). Let S * denote the event that both runs of A above are (i, j)-successful for some (i, j) and [2] ) because the view of A is the same in both runs up to ith J(.) query response). We now split event S * into two disjoint subevents S * S and S * T , depending on whether u i,l [1] = u i,l [2] for all l ∈ {1, . . . , α} (27) holds or not, respectively. If the subevent S * S occurs, then (27) holds. This means in particular that there exists l * such that u i,l * [1] = u i,l * [2] but r i,l * [1] = r i,l * [2] , which leads to ( s * l * [1]/ s * l * [2] ) ≡ (σ * ) δr mod N and hence A S 's estimate σ * = (σ * ) crδr · (σ * ) cee mod N = σ * = h i [1] 1/e mod N , which coupled with (25) means that R(m i [1] , h i [1]) = Acc and m i [1] has not been queried to S, so A S succeeds to break the PV unforgeability of RSAUDVS when S * S occurs. In the other case that subevent S * T occurs, (27) does not hold but (26) holds, meaning that A T 's output is a valid collision for the trapdoor hash so A T succeeds.
So we have shown that the sum of success probabilities of A S and A T is equal to the probability of the event S * that both runs of A are (i, j)-successful for some (i, j) ∈ W J × W S and r i [1] 
which using (24) gives the desired lower-bound (22) on Pr[S * ]. This completes the proof. ⊓ ⊔
F Proof of Theorem 5.2
Analogously to the proof of Theorem 4.4, we assume the direct verifier key-reg. protocol is used and we show how to construct the forgery strategy A 1 .
Stage 1. The pair (A 1 , A 2 ) is run on input (N, e). A 1 's oracle queries are answered as follows.
(2) KRA Queries. When A 1 makes ith key-reg. query (r i , sk i , pk i ) it is answered Acc if (sk i , pk i ) = GKF(k; r i ) and Rej else. End of Stage 1. A 1 outputs a challenge message m * , which is given to A 2 . A PV signature σ * = S(x 1 , m * ) is generated, where σ * = (h * ) 1/e mod N and h * = H(m * , s * ) for uniformly random s * ∈ R S . Stage 2 begins.
(1) CDV Queries. When A 1 makes ith CDV-query pk i , it is answered with DV signature σ i = (h i , r F,i , r i , s i ), where h i = h * , r F,i is uniformly random in R F , r i = ( r i,1 , . . . , r i,α ) = J(m * , h * , h i ), s i = ( s i,1 , . . . , s i,α ) with s i,l = k i,l ·(σ * ) r i,l mod N , α random elements k i ∈ Z Z * N , and h i = F pk ( u i ; r F,i ) with u i = ( u i,1 , . . . , u i,α ), u i,l = k e i,l mod N for l = 1, . . . , α.
Stage 1. The pair ( A 1 , A 2 ) is run on input (N, e) , , where A 1 is also given the program for A 1 as input. A 1 runs A 1 on same input and answers A 1 's oracle queries as follows.
(1) S(x 1 , .) Queries. When A 1 makes ith S-query m i , A 1 forwards it to S oracle and forwards response σ i = S(x 1 , m i ) back to A 1 . (2) KRA Queries. When A 1 makes ith key-reg. query (r i , sk i , pk i ), A 1 answers Acc if (sk i , pk i ) = GKF(k; r i ) and stores (sk i , pk i , Acc) in a table T , else it answers Rej. (3) A 2 Queries. When A 1 outputs a message m i for A 2 , A 1 forwards it to A 2 and forwards the answer a i back to A 1 .
End of Stage 1. A 1 outputs a challenge message m * , which is also output by A 1 and given to A 2 . A 1 computes h * = H(m * , s * ), for a uniformly random independent s * ∈ R S . Stage 2 begins.
(1) CDV Queries. When A 1 makes ith CDV-query pk i , A 1 searches table T for an entry (sk j , pk j , Acc) with pk j = pk i (note that this entry is guaranteed to exist in T due to the restriction on A 1 to only query CDV with public keys which have been answered with Acc by a previous KRA query) and answers with σ i = (h i , r F,i , r i , s i ), where h i = h * , r i = J(m * , h * , h i ) = ( r i,1 , . . . , r i,α ), h i = F pk ( u ′ ; r We show that A 1 's (and hence also A 2 's) view is perfectly simulated in Game no as in Game yes. In particular, the DV signatures ( σ i = (h i , r F,i , r i , s i ) are distributed identically in both games, for the following reasons. First, note that h * is computed identically in both games. Second, observe that for each DV signature, r i and s i are determined uniquely by (m * , h * , u i , r F,i ) in the same way in both games, namely r i = J(h * , F pk ( u i ; r F,i )) and s i,l are the eth roots of u i (h * ) r i,l mod N in both games. So it remains to show that (for each DV signature) the pair ( u i , r F,i ) is identically distributed in both games. In Game yes, ( u i , r F,i ) is uniform on G × R F by definition. In Game no, we have that ( u i , r 
From the perfectly-trapdoor property of TH we have that mapping r ′ F,i → CSF((sk, pk), ( u ′ , r ′ F,i ), u i ) is a permutation on R F . This and the fact that s i,l → s e i,l mod N is a permutation of Z Z * N implies that G is permutation on (Z Z * N ) α × R F . So since ( s i , r ′ F,i ) is uniform on (Z Z * N ) α × R F by definition, it follows that so is the image pair ( u i , r F,i ), as required. We conclude that A 2 outputs yes with same probability in both games and hence C A 1 (A 1 , A 2 ) = 0, as claimed. The run-time of A 1 is the run-time of A 1 plus the time q d1 O(l J T N + T F + T CSF + T J + T H + q d1 l pk + q k1 T GKF ) to answer A 1 's CDV and KRA queries. Note that q s1 = q s1 , q c1 = q c1 , and q k1 = 0, as claimed.
